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ENGLISH AND AMERICAN DIVORCE REFORM

A COMPARATIVE APPROACH: THE DIVERGENT PATHS OF
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN DIVORCE REFORM - TO TAKE
THE STEP FROM FAULT TO BREAKDOWN?
The reality of marital breakup and divorce is a problem of longstanding,
but society has yet to come to grips with this volatile social issue. Everyone
recognizes that the true significance of marriage is the lifelong cohabitation
in the home for the family. When this prospect ceases to exist, the accumulation of "empty" relationships harms the community and detracts from the
ideal of marriage. At present, the very foundation of legal divorce - legislative enactments and judicial interpretations - remains a collection of unrelated illustrations of how things should have been done in the past. The
steady trend from fault-based divorce law to the breakdown of the marriage
concept provides the framework for the following discussion. England is
currently attempting to bring its fault-oriented divorce law into step with
recent judicial decisions advocating breakdown of marriage principles. In the
United States, jurisdiction by jurisdiction is experimenting with adoption of
a complete breakdown approach in lieu of the outmoded fault concept.
No matter whether common or different points of departure and routes
are utilized, each journey will end at the same destination. The unifying
concepts that will bind the different systems of future divorce law will be the
breakdown of marriage principle as implemented by the universally effective
clinical approach.
THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE

HistoricalPerspective of Divorce in England
By the beginning of the fifth century Christian marriages were being performed in a Roman Church ceremony with tokens of paganism removed in
favor of Christian blessings. From the middle of the twelfth century until
the Reformation, the law of marriage was embodied in the laws of the Church,
the canon law, and was administered in its own Courts Christian.1 This
canon law established the principle that marriage required nothing more than
the free consent of the parties thereby making it the most formless of all
contracts. 2 It could be celebrated openly in facie ecclesiae according to church
rites or clandestinely by pro verba de futuro (a couple prefaces copulation
with a verbal declaration of their intention to be man and wife) or per
verba de praesenti (a simple announcement - "We are now man and wife") .3
A consummated marriage had the immutable character of divine law and was
4
deemed absolutely indissoluble.

I. D. McGREoOR, DIVORCE IN ENGLAND 1 (1957). See also REPORT TO ARCHBISHOP or
CANTERBURY, PUrMNG ASUNDER: A DIVORcE LAw 'oR CoNTEMPORARY SociTY (Jan. 1964).
2. D. McGREGoR, supra note 1, at 2.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 3.
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The Church abolished the general notion of divorce by elevating marriage to the status of a sacrament, but still granted a divorce a mensa et thoro
(divorce from bed and board as in modern judicial separation) if the spouse
were guilty of adultery, cruelty, or heresy. 5 Since a valid marriage was
indissoluble, impediments to marriage such as consanguinity tables and carnal
and spiritual affinities were often conjured up to fortify a finding that the
marriage did not, in fact, ever exist.6 Provisions of the Council of Trent
extirpated many scandalous canon law abuses in marriage before papal
authority in this area ceased."
The Reformation regarded marriage as a state-regulated civil contract,
and in Scotland jurisdiction over marital affairs was transferred from the
ecclesiastical courts to the commissary courts. In England, the effect of the
Reformation was more obscure. By the beginning of the sixteenth century
the Church of England affirmed its belief in the indissolubility of marriage
with relief granted only for adultery, cruelty, and the like.8 Thus, the church
maintained ecclesiastical court jurisdiction over marriage and divorce, the
indissolubility concept, and the formless marriage contract - all products of
medieval times. Because the civil courts had no jurisdiction and the ecclesiastical courts failed to grant absolute divorce, Private Acts of Parliament were
required to overrule the "divine law" and to safeguard the inheritance of
property and family succession endangered by a wife's adultery.9 In order to
ameliorate the scandalous barrage of barroom marriage ceremonies performed
by unscrupulous clergymen while the groom was intoxicated, Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753 made marriage a public and certain contract
and replaced the Church's right to determine validity of marriage by making
it a state function. 1° Accordingly, by 1836 England's marriage laws allowed
one to select either a civil or religious marriage. Additional reform resulted
in the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, which marked a decisive break with
the past.11 The Act's most important innovation was to make the civil
system of divorce available to all classes of citizens rather than solely to the
wealthy.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, two systems of legal remedies
for matrimonial discord had developed in England. 12 The wealthy utilized
the divorce court while the lower classes used the magistrate courts to obtain
separation orders. Unfortunately, both systems' use of adultery as the sole
basis for terminating a marriage became an incitement to immorality as
adultery or perjury had to be committed before a divorce could be granted.

5.

Id.

6. Id. at 4.
7. Id. at 5. Absolute divorce was granted for adultery and malicious desertion of four
years duration.
8. Id. at 9.
9. Id. at 10. Practically speaking, the Private Act could be invoked only by influential
men whose wives had been adulterous.
10. Id. at 14.
11. Id. at 18.
12. Id. at 24.
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The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1950 offered some relief by allowing a hus3
band or wife to petition for divorce on the grounds that the respondent:'
(a) has since the marriage committed adultery; or
(b) has deserted the petitioner without cause for a period of at least
three years preceding the presentation of this petition; or
(c) has treated petitioner with cruelty; or
(d) is incurably of unsound mind and has been under care for at
least five years prior to presentation of the petition; and by the wife
if her husband has been guilty of rape, sodomy, or bestiality.
4
No petition could be presented until three years after the marriage ceremony.'
Because of dogged court dockets stemming from the rule that all divorce
cases were to be heard in London before 1920, poor persons and undefended
cases were transferred to certain assize towns.1 5 In 1946, commissioners with
the authority of High Court judges sat in London and thirty-eight provincial
towns to hear divorce petitions by all classes. 16 This change was followed
closely by the Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949, which gave all citizens access
to the divorce court.' 7
The next two decades witnessed a plethora of committee investigations
and surveys in the area of divorce reform. These will be critically reviewed
in a later section of this note.

The Present Grounds for Divorce
Obtaining a divorce in England involves proof of a matrimonial offense,
set out in categorized grounds specifically including: 9 (1) adultery; (2)
desertion without cause for a period of three years; (3) cruelty; (4) iricurable
unsoundness of mind of the respondent under continuous care and treatment
for at least five years preceding the petition for divorce; (5) rape, sodomy,
or bestiality by the husband; 20 and (6) presumption of death. 2" The first
three grounds are "determinate causes," implying the notion of guilt; that is,
one party must be shown to be dearly at fault or no divorce will be granted.
For cruelty, injury to health is an indispensable condition precedent, and
mere insinuations against a spouse's character are insufficient. 2" Formerly, it
was also necessary to show a malignant intention to injure before cruelty
13.

Matrimonial Causes Act of 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 25, §1.

The Matrimonial Causes Act

of 1937, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 57, §7, added insanity, cruelty, and desertion to adultery
as grounds for divorce.
14. Matrimonial Causes Act of 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 25, §2.
15. D. McGREOR, supra note 1, at 32.
16. Id.

17. Id. at 34.
18. RoYAL COMMISSION REPORT, OAID. No. 9678, at 56 (1956).
19. Matrimonial Causes Act of 1965, c. 72 §1 (a). Note that the grounds for divorce
of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1950 were adopted in toto by the 1965 act.
20. Matrimonial Causes Act of 1965, c. 72, §1 (1) (b). See also T.V.T. [1964] P. 85 (C.A.)
in which a wife was denied recovery because she had consented to sodomy.
21. Matrimonial Causes Act of 1965, c. 72, § 14 (1).
22. Russell v. Russell, [1897] A.C. 395.
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could be used as the ground for a divorce.2 3 Today, the fault concept is so
deeply engrained in England that a matrimonial offense has to be proved
with the same certainty as a criminal offense.24
Adultery. The first major ground for divorce is adultery, voluntary sexual
intercourse between a married person and a person of the opposite sex, the
two not being married to each other.2 5 Because the act must be voluntary
both physically and mentally, insanity is a defense if within the M'Naghten
Rule.26 It is not necessary to prove the complete act of intercourse as in
marriage consummation litigation, but partial or limited penetration must be
shown. Acts of sexual gratification unaccompanied by penetration are insufficient.27 Evidence of adultery must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt the same standard that applies to all matrimonial offenses in England.2
Circumstantial evidence will not establish guilt unless the facts relied upon
will support no other inference.29 "Hotel evidence" is often used in English
jurisdictions to infer that adultery took place when the respondent and
corespondent spent the night in the same room, but this is rebuttable if the
circumstances are suspicious or suggest collusion or where the accused convinces the court of the veracity of his denial. 30 Also, either party may admit
evidence to show that complete intercourse did or did not occur, but this is
not compulsory31 However, a party's failure to deny the adultery with which
he is charged, thus protecting himself from cross-examination, is a circumstance to be considered by the court in deciding whether the charge has been
proved.

32

Desertion. The ground of desertion encompasses a cessation of cohabitation between husband and wife by fault or act of the deserting spouse if, in
fact, two elements are present - separation and intent to desert without cause
for at least a three-year period. 3 3 Desertion may be claimed in abandonment
situations and where one party causes the other to live separate and apart.3 4

23. Fowler v. Fowler, 2 T.L.R. 143, 145 (C.A. 1952). Lord Justice Hodson in Fowler
remarked: "The word 'cruel' itself, in its ordinary meaning, seems . . . to imply the
notion of malignity...."
24. Ginesi v. Ginesi 64 T.L.R. 167 (C.A. 1948); Blyth v. Blyth, [1966] 1 All E.R. 524.
Blyth stipulates that clear proof is required of adultery, but believes the current standard
is something less than beyond a reasonable doubt.
25.
26.

D. ToLsToy, THE LAW
S. v. S. [1962] P. 133.

AND PRACrlcE OF DIVORCE 27

(1963).

27. Dennis v. Dennis, [1955] P. 153 (C.A.); Rutherford v. Richardson, [1923] A.C. 1, 11.
28. Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones, [1951] A.C. 391 (non-access); Gower v. Gower, [1950]
I All E.R. 804 (G.A.).
29. Beer v. Beer, [1948] P. 10.
30. Aylward v. Aylward, 44 T.L.R. 456 [1928]; Farnham v. Farnham, [1925] 133 L.T.R.
(n.s.) 320; England v. England, [1953] P. 16.
31. Matrimonial Causes Act of 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 25, §32 (1) (a).
32. Poyser v. Poyser, [1952] 2 All E.R. 949 (C.A.).
33. Frowd v. Frowd, [1904] P. 177, 179.
34. Jackson v. Jackson, [1924] P. 19, 23. But see Wilkes v. Wilkes, [1943] P. 41 (de-
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The essence of desertion is the break-up of the matrimonial home caused by
withdrawal of one spouse from a state of cohabitation, and conduct short
of this does not equal desertion. 35 Neither indifferent attitude nor faithlessness
are adequate bases for a desertion charge, nor is cohabitation of the same
bedroom where no marriage duties are performed.36 The area of constructive
desertion is expansive and includes conduct short of cruelty, which lacks the
elements of injury to health, intent to injure, or gravity of conduct.3 7 An
analysis of the impact on this area of two -well-known British cases, Hall v.
Hall38 and Saunders v. Saunders,39 will be considered in a later section.
Cruelty. Cruelty, the most frequently alleged ground in divorce, refers to
wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such a character as to cause danger to life,
limb, health (bodily or mental), or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger.40 The physical violence aspect of cruelty must have been
aimed at the petitioner, since a man is presumed to intend the natural and
probable consequences of his acts. But wilful intention to injure,41 or a
spiteful or malignant intention42 or even knowledge that the acts are crue4 3
need not be shown. Likewise, the old rule held that conduct not directed at
the petitioner, such as drunkenness or laziness, is not cruelty unless done for
the express purpose of wounding petitioner's feelings or done in circumstances so that the respondent must know injury would result to the petitioner.44 The landmark decisions of Collins v. Collins s and Williams v.
Williams- introduce a new cruelty concept that will be examined in detail.
Unsoundness of Mind. Under the Matrimonial Causes Acts of 1950 and
196547 either spouse may petition for divorce on the ground that the respond-

sertion was held to have taken place although the husband continued to live with his
wife under the same roof for over a year; however, they were completely separated). Hopes
v. Hopes, [1949] P. 227 (CA.).
35. Pulford v. Pulford, [1923] P. 18, 21, 22.
36. Beeken v. Beeken, [1948] P. 302 (CA.); Timmins v. Timmins, [1953] 1 W.L.R. 757,
761, 762 (CA. 1953), held desertion is an offense if it is without cause and cause can consist of grave and weighty conduct, even though that conduct fall short of an actual matrimonial offense. See also Young v. Young, [1964] P. 152, at 156-58 where conduct not grave

and weighty was deemed insufficient for withdrawal from cohabitation.
37. Forbes v. Forbes, 1 W.L.R. 1526 (1954) (husband's adultery);. Eastbourne v. Croydon, [1910] 2 K.B. 16.

38. [1962] 1 W.L.R. 1246 (C.A.).
59.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

[1965] 2 W.L.R. 32.
Russell v. Russell, [1895] P. 315, 322; Horton v. Horton, [1940] P. 187, 192, 193.
Jamieson v. Jamieson, [1952] A.C. 525, 540.
Squire v. Squire, [1949] P. 51 (CA. 1948).
Usmar v. Usmar, [1949] P. 1 (1948).
See Hall v. Hall, [1962] 3 All E.R. 578 (C.A.); Kaslefsky v. Kaslefsky, [1951] P. 38,

46 (CA. 1950).
45.
46.
47.
Act of

[1963] 3 W.L.R. 176.
[1963] 3 W.L.R. 213.
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 25, §1 (1) (d); Matrimonial Causes
1965, c. 72, §1 (1) (a).
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ent is of incurably unsound mind and has been continuously under care and
treatment for at least five years immediately preceding the presentation of
the petition. The test here seems to be whether by reason of his mental
condition the respondent is incapable of managing his affairs 48 or is currently
unable to live a normal married life with no real prospect of being able to
9

do so in the future.4

Defenses and Bars to Petitions for Dissolution of Marriage
The Absolute Bars. The absolute bars or defenses now include connivance
and condonation.50 Connivance means permission or acquiescense in the
respondent's adulterous conduct and must precede such acts. 51 The essence

of connivance, then, is an intention to encourage and promote adulterous
association. 52 This intention must be of a corrupt nature, so mere negligence,
inattention, or indifference is not connivance. 53 Thus, a man (or woman)
cannot knowingly tolerate his spouse's adultery while maintaining relations
54
with her and then obtain a legal remedy for her infidelity.
The second absolute defense, condonation, is forgiveness of a matrimonial
offense, and the restoration of the offending spouse to the same position occupied before the offense was committed.55 The two elements of forgiveness
and restoration are essential in this defense. Cohabitation and sexual intercourse5 6 may be used only to prove the above two elements and alone are
not sufficient to establish the defense. In Henderson v. Henderson,57 where
an estranged wife was shown to have had intercourse with her husband after
his marital offense, one act of intercourse was conclusive proof of condonation
even though no forgiveness was present-s even if done only for reconciliation
48. Whysall v. Whysall, [1960] P. 52 (1959).
49. Robinson v. Robinson, [1965] P. 192 (1964), held the requisite mental disorder need
not be a congenital mental illness.
50. The defense of collusion previously was an absolute bar but now is discretionary.
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1963, c. 45, §4, amending Matrimonial Causes Act of 1950, 14

Geo. 6, c. 25, §§4, 5.
51. Churchman v. Churchman, [1945] P. 44; Douglas v. Douglas, [1951] P. 85 (C.A.

1950).
52. Douglas v. Douglas, [1951] P. 85 (C.A. 1950); Haynes v. Haynes, [1960] 1 W.L.R.
968.
53. Rogers v. Rogers, 162 Eng. Rep. 1079 (1830); Phillips v. Phillips, 163 Eng. Rep.
993 (1884).
54. Lloyd v. Lloyd, [1938] P. 174. Godfrey v. Godfrey, [1955] A.G. 444 (1964), has held
that a petitioner who connived an act of adultery with the respondent is precluded from
relying upon a subsequent act unless an absence of a causal connection between the
original connivance and the later adultery is shown.
55. Crocker v. Crocker, [1921] P. 25 (C.A. 1920).
56. Henderson v. Henderson, [1944] A.C. 49 (1943); Higgins v. Higgins, [1943] P. 58;
Lawrence v. Lawrence, [1946] W.N. 126. Matrimonial Causes Act of 1965, c. 72, §42(1)

notes that if sexual intercourse has taken place with knowledge of the offense, a rebuttable
presumption of condonation is raised.
57. [1944] A.C. 49 (1943).
58. Cramp v. Cramp, [1920] P. 158 Fearn v. Fearn, [1948] P. 241 (C.A.), stipulated that
the mere words of forgiveness do not themselves constitute condonation.
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purposes 9 and even if only at the wife's persuasion.60 The rule of Carson v.
Carson-' now holds that any presumption of condonation from the continuance of intercourse may be rebutted by either spouse by evidence sufficient to
negate the necessary intent in any act both before and after the sexual union.
The Matrimonial Causes Act of 196362 allows a resumption of cohabitation
between parties for a single period no longer than three months if such reunion is aimed purely at a possible reconciliation.
The revival of a condoned offense is frequently relied upon in English
matrimonial litigation. Here, condonation is subject to the implied condition
that there is no matrimonial offense, that is, if a party whose matrimonial
offense has been condoned commits another, the condoned offense is revived
and divorce proceedings can be based on both offenses. 63 Thus, unless fraud
or duress negates condonation, or unless a fresh matrimonial offense revives
the previously condoned violation, no proceeding can be initiated for a
condoned offense. 64
The Discretionary Bars. A cursory glance will be given to the five original
discretionary defenses to dissolution of the marriage contract, following a
more careful analysis of the old absolute bar of collusion, which is now
discretionary. Collusion is an agreement or bargain between spouses procuring the initiation of a suit or stipulating their conduct therein. 65 Examples
of collusion include agreements to commit or appear to commit adultery,66
or to institute proceedings for a monetary consideration, or not to claim
damages 67 or alimony. 6 It is collusion to provide evidence in return for
assurance that neither costs nor damages will be disclosed. 69
The second discretionary bar is unreasonable delay in presenting or
prosecuting a petition for divorce. For such a tactic to be unreasonable,
it must be culpable - that is, something in the nature of connivance or
acquiescence in a matrimonial offense. 70 Five factors are considered by the
court in the third discretionary bar of petitioner's adultery: 71 (a) the position

59. Viney v. Viney, [1951] P. 457.
60. Benton v. Benton, [1958] P. 12 (C.A. 1957); Willan v. Willan, [1960] 1 W.L.R. 624
(CA.) (wife pestered husband and denied him his necessary sleep).
61. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 511 (1963).
62. Matrimonial Causes Act of 1963, c. 45, § (1). See also Matrimonial Causes Act of
1965, c. 72, §42 (2).
63. Scott v. Scott, [1960] 1 W.L.R. 915.
64. Condoned adultery is not capable of revival. Matrimonial Causes Act of 1963, c.
45, §3; Matrimonial Causes Act of 1965, c. 72, §42 (3).
65. Churchward v. Churchward, [1895] P. 7, 25.
66. Crewe v. Crewe, [1800] 162 Eng. Rep. 1102.
67. Churchward v. Churchward, [1895] P. 7.
68. Emanuel v. Emanuel, [1946] P. 115.
69. Noble v. Noble (No. 2), [1964] P. 250, 257 (C.A.).
70. Rickard v. Rickard, [1921] 37 T.L.R. 26, 511 (C.A.).
71. Coleman v. Coleman, [1955] 1 W.L.R. 1235 (CA.); Blunt v. Blunt, [1943] A.C. 517. See
also Bull v. Bull [1953] P. 224 (CA.) for enumeration of the other considerations making
up the community interest factor set forth in Blunt.
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and interest of the children; (b) the third party's interest with the adulterer;
(c) the prospect of reconciliation; (d) the petitioner's interest and remarriage
possibility; and (e) the community's interest.
The remaining discretionary bars include cruelty and desertion before
the complained of offense and conduct by the petitioner conducive to
72
respondent's adulterous conduct, desertion, or unsoundness of mind.
Gollins, Williams and Hall - The Bridge to Breakdown of Marriage
Three important cases, Gollins v. Gollins73 (cruelty),
liams74 (insanity), and Hall v. Hall

5

Williams v. Wil-

(desertion) reflect the uncertainty in

the field of matrimonial law in England. Both Gollins and Williams have
greatly expanded the concept of matrimonial cruelty by initiating a legal
vacillation away from the traditional doctrine of matrimonial offense based
upon fault and moving toward the principle of marriage breakdown or
divorce without fault. This is the most significant development in the concept of matrimonial cruelty since injury to health was made an essential test
of cruelty in 1897.76
The Gollins decision involved a bone-idle husband who forced his wife
to run their home as a guesthouse to meet the financial needs of the family
and the demands of creditors. Although no physical harm or violence occurred, Mrs. Gollins obtained a maintenance order and later added a noncohabitation clause based upon her husband's persistent cruelty and a doctor's
report indicating that she was suffering from moderately severe anxiety as
a result of his conduct. The Gollins court found the husband guilty of cruelty,
holding that an intention to injure one's spouse is not an essential element in
divorce proceedings. The main issue was a question of fact and degree as
to "whether this conduct by this man to this woman, or vice-versa, is
cruelty?"7 7 Three basic elements of cruelty were enumerated in the opinion:

(1) injury or danger to health of the other spouse, (2) mental intent to do
the act, but a certain mental state is not essential, although it may be a relevant factor in assessing (3) whether the conduct is sufficiently grave or
weighty to amount to cruelty.7

9

Lord Pierce concluded:

79

A reasonable person, after taking due account of the temperament
of all the other particular circumstances, would consider that the
conduct complained of is such that this spouse should not be called
on to endure it.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Richards v. Richards, [1952] P. 307 (C.A.).
[1963] 2 All E.R. 966.
[1963] 2 All E.R. 994.
[1962] 1 W.L.R. 1246 (C.A.).
Russell v. Russell, [1895] P. 315, 322 (C.A.).
Lauder v. Lauder, [1949] 1 All E.R. 76, 90 (C.A.) (emphasis by the court).
Gollins v. Gollins, [1963] 2 All E.R. 966, 969.
Id. at 992.
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The decision seems to eclipse the requirement of intention to bring about
the consequences of one's acts, although this does not completely obscure
the possibility that the act itself might still have to be deliberate, or even that
knowledge of the injurious consequences should be proved. 0 The court seems
to be revolting here against a purely subjective doctrine by forging a constructive intention concept; that is, a drunk is as much to blame as a wifebeater for destruction of the marital home. This thought process may be
combined with an objective standard of the reasonable man in similar circumstances, and finally, a consideration of the respondent's own foresight
and intentions concerning the consequences of his actions. By this process, the
court moves toward a position where intention or actual knowledge is not
the test, but rather the actual consequences followed by a suitable remedy
for the injured party. In sum, the mental ingredient in cruelty is removed
"[i]f the conduct complained of and its consequences are so bad that the
petitioner must have a remedy, then it does not matter what was the state
of the respondent's mind."81
The previous rule on insanity in matrimonial suits held the logical
remedy to be restraint of the insane spouse, not release of his partner from
the contract.8 2 In the 1954 case of Palmer v. Palmer,s 3 where the husband
assaulted his wife while under the delusion that she was unfaithful, the court
found the husband's cruelty not excused by the M'Naghten Rule. Nevertheless, the court dearly indicated that M'Naghten would excuse cruelty if both
"limbs" of the rule were met.84 Here, the husband knew what he was doing
and knew that it would be wrong even if she had in fact been guilty of
adultery. In Williams v. Williams,5 the husband of ten years was certified
insane when he began to hear voices. Upon returning home after hospital
care, he was told by the voices that his wife was acting as a prostitute and
her clients were hiding in the home. Expressly not following Palmer, the
court held that an insane person meeting both limbs of M'Naghten was not
necessarily excused from the charge of cruelty in a divorce suit, but insanity
would merely be one factor of the gravity of circumstances test.88
The effect of Gollins and Williams on matrimonial cruelty has been to
cause one's state of mind to bear only upon the gravity and weight of con80. Sir Carleton Allen remarked: "The husband who persists in excessive drinking, or

in gambling away his wages, or in promiscuous amours, or in neglecting a sick wife, is not
usually 'aiming at' his spouse at all. but at his own gratification. Actions like these
arise as we have said from selfishness, and their culpability lies in . . . [taking] no account
of her . . . . [B]lameworthiness consists not in intention but in lack of intention." Allen,
Matrimonial Cruelty, 73 L.Q. REv. 316, 512, 527 (1957).
81. Gollins v. Gollins, [1963] 2 All E.R. 966, 974.
82. Hall v. Hall, [1864] 3 Sw. & Tr. 347, 349.

83. [1955] P. 4 (CA. 1954).
84. The two limbs of the M'Naghten Rule of legal insanity are normally applied to
criminal cases. The rule provides that to prove exculpating insanity, it is necessary to

prove that at the commission of the crime the accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason from mental disease as not to know the quality and nature of the act he was doing,
or that he did not know that what he was doing was morally wrong. Id. at 7-9.
85. [1963] 2 All E.R. 994.
86. Id. at 1002-04.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1969

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 6
110

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXII

duct complained of and not to be considered as a separate requisite of cruelty.
Actual intention to injure or foresight that conduct will have injurious consequences may serve only in an analysis of whether a party's actions are to
be eradicated from the spectrum of the "ordinary wear and tear of married
life."87 The court will then objectively assess the gravity and weight of the
respondent's conduct by asking: "Would a reasonable person, after taking
due account of the temperament and all other particular circumstances, consider the conduct of the spouse beyond endurance or so bad that the petitioner
must have a remedy?"'88 This concept of "justice demanding a remedy" was
met in Gollins without abandoning the mental intent requirement, but its
rejection was necessary to pave the way for the Williarns holding that an
unsound mind is no defense to matrimonial cruelty.8 9
Both cases play down the subjective elements in cruelty and constructive
desertion since they drain matrimonial offenses of culpability. Marital cruelty
without culpability is equivalent to divorce without fault, which opens the
floodgates for use of the breakdown of marriage principle as a basis for
divorce in place of the time-honored matrimonial offense doctrine. 90
The final area for consideration involves the ground of desertion in
divorce actions and the case of Hall v. Hall.91 There are basically two types
of desertion: actual and constructive. The abandonment of the marital
consortium with the intent to bring it permanently to an end constitutes
actual desertion. The antithesis of this well-settled area is acts of constructive
92
desertion that must be serious but short of actual matrimonial offense status.
In Hall, the wife left the matrimonial home when her husband's excessive
drinking became unbearable. The habitual drinking was not deemed to be
legal cruelty because of a lack of any ill effect upon the wife's health, but
it constituted constructive desertion because the conduct was sufficiently
reprehensible to entitle her to leave the home. Again, the reasonable wife
could not be expected to endure such conduct, although she had done so for
over twenty years in this case. Actual intent is discarded in favor of knowledge
and foresight of the effect of one's conduct, and, just as in cruelty situations,
insanity is not a defense. This constructive desertion concept is used to
shroud the lack of the husband's intent to push the wife from their home.
It achieves the same result without altering the traditional interpretation of
the law but at the price of certainty and clarity.
It is clear that the Gollins holding that intention to injure is not needed
for a finding of cruelty, the Williams decision that an unsound mind equals
no defense to matrimonial cruelty, and the Hall rule that conduct known to
be likely to drive the other spouse away equals constructive desertion have
87. Brown, Cruelty Without Culpability or Divorce Without Fault, 26 MoD. L. REv.
625, 629 (1963).
88. Id. at 644.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 645.
91. [1962] 1 W.L.R. 1246 (G.A.).
92. Goodhart, Cruelty Without Culpability or Divorce Without Fault, 79 L.Q. REv. 98,
111 (1963).
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clouded British matrimonial law. This result is attributable to judicial
attempts to engraft an interpretation founded upon the breakdown principle
upon statutes drafted in the terminology and spirit of the matrimonial offense
principle.
Introduction of the Breakdown Principle - The Royal Commission Report
In the past decade the doctrine of the matrimonial offense has been
subjected to considerable criticism. There have been numerous proposals
designed to supplement or eradicate it as the criterion upon which divorce
should be founded, substituting in its place the concept of "breakdown of
marriage" as an additional, if not the only, standard.
The first notable effort in this direction was the report made by the
Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce and presented to Parliament by
command of Her Majesty in 1956. 93 The doctrine of breakdown purports to
eliminate fault on the part of one party as the basis for granting a divorce to
the other and in its place provides for one concise, comprehensive ground
for divorce - simply that the marriage has broken down. 94 This theory
recognizes that what was once a marriage relationship has now in fact come
to an end and that the court should give legal recognition to such a development, no matter what the cause.
While it was the view of the Royal Commission that the then existing
law based on the matrimonial offense should be retained, there was a diversion of opinion as to whether a new ground built upon the breakdown
95
principle should be added:
(a) Nine of the nineteen members of the Commission were opposed to any introduction of the breakdown principle because they
considered it to be gravely detrimental to the well-being of the community.
(b) Nine other members considered that the time had come to
introduce the breakdown principle to a linited extent. They proposed
that where a husband and wife lived apart for seven years, it should be
possible for either spouse to obtain a dissolution of the marriage if the
other spouse did not object.
(c) Four of the above same nine (section b), however, consider that..-:
it would be advisable to widen the scope of the new ground to allow a
husband or wife to obtain a divorce, notwithstanding the objections of
the other spouse, if she or he could satisfy the court that the separation
was in part due to the unreasonable conduct of the other spouse.
The Royal Commission, alternatively, considered several new grounds
that would constitute a matrimonial offense: 96

,93. ROYAL COMMISSION
94. Id. §58.
95. Id. §§65-69.

REPORT ON MARRIAGE AND DIVoRcE, CMD. No. 9678

(1951-1955).

96. Id. §§72-112.
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(1) wilful refusal to consummate the marriage,
(2) artificial insemination by a donor without the husband's consent,
(3) detention as a mental defective of dangerous or violent
proportions,
(4) wilful refusal to have a child,
(5) wilful and persistent refusal of sexual intercourse,
(6) incompatibility of temperaments,
(7) Lesbianism,
(8) imprisonment,
(9) cruelty to a child of either spouse,
(10) commission of a sexual offense against a child of either
spouse, and
(11) murder.
Of the eleven grounds, the first three were, in fact, recommended as additional grounds for divorce while the latter eight were rejected as unsuitable
as a matrimonial offense. Presumably these latter eight could still be fitted
into the breakdown of marriage ground.
When the Royal Commission submitted its report to Parliament it met
considerable opposition. Critics maintained that divorces would be too easy
to obtain and that the sanctity of marriage as an institution was being
threatened. While it was agreed that the Royal Commission had done a commendable job in researching the present state of divorce law, it was felt that
their proposals were too liberal to be accepted yet by the public. Accordingly,
the Commission's product was not enacted into law. 9 7 However, the Royal

Commission's Report on Marriage and Divorce opened the door by alerting
the public to subsequent reform measures also based on the breakdown
principle.
Breakdown Reconsidered - the Law Commission's Report of 1965
The next significant step in the evolution of the breakdown of marriage
principle was a proposal entitled Reform of the Grounds of Divorce"8 submitted by the Law Commission of 1965 in answer to the basic question:
"Should the rise in the divorce rate in England cause alarm?" 99 The Commission adopted the standard accepted by the Royal Commission Report. 10
The Western world has recognised that it is in the best interests of
all concerned - the community, the parties to a marriage, and their
children - that marriage should be monogamous and that it should
last for life. It has also always recognised that, owing to human
97. Many recommendations by appointed Royal Commissions have been legislatively
enacted. See,

e.g., WOLFENDEN REPORT, GREAT BRITAIN ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROS-

(1957) (recommending legitimizing homosexual activities between
consenting adults in private) enacted as Sexual Offenses Act 1967, c. 60.
98. LAW COMMISSION REPORT, REFORM OF THE GROUNDS OF DIVORCE, CMND. No. 3123.
99. Id. §5.
100. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, CMD. No. 9678, at 7 (1951TITUTION,

CMD. No. 247

1955).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss1/6

12

Hayskar and Boose: A Comparative Approach: The Divergent Paths of English and Americ

1969]

ENGLISH AND AMERICAN DIVORCE REFORM

frailty, some marriages will not endure for life, and that in certain
circumstances it is right that a spouse should be released from the
obligations of marriage.
The Law Commission concluded that the present divorce law based on the
matrimonial offense doctrine was inadequate in light of the standard. "Retention of such a principle does not do all it might to aid the stability of
marriage, but tends rather to discourage attempts at reconciliation. It does
not enable all dead marriages to be buried, and those it does bury are not
always interred with the minimum of distress and humiliation. And finally,
insistence on guilt and innocence tends to embitter relationships, with
particular damage to the children, rather than promoting future harmony."'' 1
In particular, the matrimonial offense doctrine has failed to solve four
°2
problems with which any divorce reform law must grapple:1
(1) Reconciliation. There must be a means by which the parties are
made aware of counseling services or other avenues whereby they can
work out their marital disputes and be encouraged to continue their
marriage relationship which may have only broken down temporarily.
(2) Stable Illicit Unions. It must be recognized that due to the
present difficulties in terminating a marriage relationship, many spouses
have separated and subsequently come to live and cohabit with new
partners. Accordingly, this result must be either publicly legitimized, or
if this is not to be desired, then a means of legally ending the first
marriage must be provided.
(3) Justice to the Wife (the innocent party). The present laws
operate to the comparative disadvantage of the wife. Any reform must
counter, if not eliminate, the inequalities she suffers in regard to depreciation of economics and status, being subjected to scandal by the actual
wrongdoer (the husband), and lastly, the inevitable insecurity the wife
must feel as a divorce becomes imminent and then takes place.
(4) Position of the Children. Since perhaps the most serious and
disturbing aspect of the breakdown of a marriage and divorce is the
effect upon the children, there must be a procedure that will insure
that the best interests of the child will be considered and provided for
via adequate custodial and financial support arrangements.
In light of the above problems, the Law Commissioners submitted three
alternative reform proposals, with emphasis on the practical difficulties that
would be encountered if any modification were to be accepted. The three
103
proposals include:
(a) divorce on the sole ground of breakdown of marriage,
(b) divorce by consent as an addition to the existing grounds
based on matrimonial offenses,
(c) divorce after a period of separation as an addition to the
existing grounds.

101.

LAw COMMSSION REPORT, REFORm OF THE GROUNDS OF DIVORCE, CMND. No. 3128,

16 (1965).
102. Id. §§29-51.
103.

Id. §53.
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The Commission then suggested the following proposals that would implement the three general theories respectively.104
Breakdown With Inquest. In effect, this solution rejects the matrimonial offense doctrine and adopts the breakdown principle as the only
criterion in divorce law. The role of the court would be merely to
scrutinize the facts of each marriage relationship, on an individual basis,
and grant a divorce if satisfied that the relationship had finally broken
down. The advantage of such a proposal is that "a divorce law founded
upon the doctrine of breakdown would be in accord with social realities
and would have the merit of showing divorce for what in essence it is not a reward for marital virtue on the one side and a penalty for marital
delinquency on the other, nor a victory for one spouse and reverse for the
other - but a defeat for both, a failure of the marital two-in-onemanship
in which both of its members, however unequal their responsibility,
are involved together." 105 The basic weakness of this proposal is that it
calls for an elaborate, time-consuming, and expensive investigation by
the court to determine if the marriage has in fact ended.
Breakdown Without Inquest. This concept recognizes that the parties
themselves are likely to be better judges of the viability of their marriage
than a court could be. Accordingly, a breakdown evidenced by a sixmonth separation would be the only grounds for divorce. While it may
be agreed that the ending of cohabitation and a sustained failure to
resume it for six months are the most objective and justiciable indications
of breakdown, this proposal has been criticized mainly because a six-month
period is not long enough to determine the stability of a marriage and
any chance for possible reconciliation.
Divorce by Consent. This proposal is put forth with only two conditions: the other grounds for divorce should remain available and consensual divorce should be restricted to cases where there are no dependent
children. A husband and wife could obtain a divorce immediately if both
consented and if the marriage had endured for at least three years. 106
The merits to this proposal are several. It would spare the parties the
humiliation and embarrassment of divorce proceedings and would be
practical and feasible in light of the fact that ninety-three per cent of all
Furthermore, it would be in accord
divorces in England are uncontested.'
with recent tendencies that have relaxed the prohibition on collusion - a
step closer to legalizing consensual divorce.10
On the other hand, there are several disadvantages to allowing divorce
by consent. It can be argued that enactment of such a law would reduce
marriage to the status of a private contract and ignore the community's
interest in the marriage relationship. Additionally, it is feared that
marriage would be embarked upon without responsibility, perhaps even
on a trial basis with no repercussion to the parties if the relationship
were not successful. Divorce by consent would also provides a means by
which marriages, not irretrievably broken down, could be prematurely
dissolved. Finally, acceptance of divorce by consent would surely result
in an increased divorce rate.
104. Id. §§54-105.
105.

106.
107.

Id. §57 (d).

U.K. Matrimonial Causes Act §47 (1963).
LAW COMMISSION

REPORT,

RFFORM

OF TIlE GROUNDS

OF DivoacE,

CNIND.

No.

3123,

§58, at 29 (1965).
108. U.K. Matrimonial Causes Act §4 (1963).
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Divorce on the Ground of Separation. As the third alternative policy,
the Law Commissioners would grant a divorce after a two-year separation
if the parties each consented to the divorce. However, if one of the
spouses did not consent, the prescribed period of separation would be
lengthened to five or seven years. The two-year period was considered
necessary so as not to undermine the sanctity and stability concepts, while
the five- to seven-year period was justifiable because public opinion would
demand an appreciably longer period of separation if one party objected.
In all cases, the traditional matrimonial offenses would remain available
to the parties.
It is noteworthy that the New Zealand legislature considered a recommendation similar to the Law Commission's proposal of Divorce Upon the
Ground of Separation and in 1963 enacted it into law. 109 The New Zealand
provision allows the parties themselves to decide whether their relationship
should terminate and to regulate their new position after three years of separation by mutual consent. Yet another example of permitting divorce upon
the grounds of separation is illustrated by an Australian divorce law: 110
"Separation for five years may be a grounds for divorce. However, the Court
has discretion to deny the decree if the circumstances would be harsh or
oppressive to the respondent, or contrary to the public interest."
Based on the reform measures enacted in these two countries, it was generally agreed that the Law Commissioner's third alternative proposal, that
of Divorce on the Grounds of Separation, stood the best likelihood of acceptance in England. The allegation has been made that the Commissioners were
too preoccupied with selling their prize package of divorce by consent. By
coupling consent with the two-year separation provision (which probably
would have passed had it been presented separately) they rendered the whole
proposal too liberal for acceptance.1 1 To date, none of the three proposals
submitted by the Law Commission has become law despite the merits of each
and the constant agitation and pressure for divorce reform in England.
English Divorce Reform Bill of 1968*
There is presently before the House of Commons a proposal for the reform
of English Divorce Law. The proposal has stirred considerable public controversy and elicited vigorous debate on the floor of Parliament. If passed, the
only ground on which a petition for divorce could be presented is that the
12
marriage has irretrievably broken down.1
109. N.Z. Matrimonial Proceedings Act §29 (2) (1963).
110. Austl. Matrimonial Causes Act §21 (1963).
111. McKenna, Divorce by Consent and for Breakdown of Marriage, 30 MoDEmN L. RV.
121, 137 (1967).
*Editor'sNote. The British Divorce Reform Bill of 1968 had been acted upon favorably
in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords as of August 1969. The bill was
amended slightly as a result of the Lords' debate and has been returned to Commons for
a consideration of these amendments. The bill should become law no later than October of
1969. The Law Commission is also preparing a companion bill providing safeguards for
the financial well-being of divorced women.
112. Divorce Reform Act of 1968, §1,
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Breakdown would be established by satisfying the court of one of the
following facts:" 3
(1) that the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner
finds it intolerable to live with him or her;
(2) that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner
cannot be reasonably expected to live with him or her;
(3) that the respondent has deserted the petitioner for at least two
years prior to the petition;
(4) that the parties have lived apart for at least two years prior
to petitioning, and the respondent does not object to the grant of a
decree;
(5) that the parties have lived apart for at least five years prior to
petitioning.
On proof of one of the above, the court must grant a decree unless it is
satisfied on all the evidence that the marriage has not irretrievably broken
down.
There is also a safeguard section within this proposal, which is designed
to encourage reconciliation. 1 14 Two of the clauses require that each party's
attorney discuss the prospect of reconciliation with his client and assure that
each party is provided with a list of names of agencies that specialize in
reconciliation work. Additionally, the courts would be granted the right to
adjourn the divorce proceedings for a period of up to three months if a
reconciliation appeared plausible. It is up to the court to adjourn for up
to six months if the parties themselves wish to try to work together again.
In each of these cases the petitioner would not be held to have lost his right
to obtain a subsequent divorce decree if the attempted reconciliation proved
unsuccessful.
Whether the growing dissatisfaction with present English divorce law
coupled with the increasing acceptance and popularity of the breakdown
approach to divorce will lead to the passage and enactment of this new reform
act cannot be predicted. At this time the bill has successfully passed its
second reading in Parliament, which is more than the Royal Commission
Report of 1956 or the Law Commissioners Report of 1965 accomplished.
Final Considerations upon the English Experience*
While England has remained the foremost proponent of the stare decisis
principle, the time has come to abandon its antiquated divorce law based on
the commission of a matrimonial offense and to substitute for it a suitable
reform measure founded upon the more realistic marriage breakdown princi113.

Divorce Reform Act of 1968, §2 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e).

114. Divorce Reform Act of 1968, §3 (1) (2) (3a).
Editor's Note. California has recently enacted a new divorce law, which provides that a
divorce may be granted if "the court finds that there are irreconcilable differences, which
have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage ......
Ch. 1608, §4508 (a) [1969]
Calif. Sess. Laws 3109. The act specifies that it is to become effective on Jan. 1, 1970. Id.
§3129.
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ple. After tracing to the present the development of divorce law in England
and analyzing some of the more notable efforts to inject various elements of
the breakdown concept into English law, it is apparent that a major shift
in approach to divorce must lie just over the horizon. It is not the purpose
of this note to draft specific divorce legislation, but to discuss the pros and
cons revealed by a dose scrutiny of the present law in light of the recently
submitted reform proposals. Hopefully, as Parliament considers the present
Divorce Reform Act of 1968 it will be persuaded to enact it in some form.
The effect of such a step by Parliament would be to align the legislature
with the position already taken by the courts in the Gollins, Williams, and
Hall cases - the net result being a legitimate stamp of approval upon the
marriage breakdown principle and the demise of the matrimonial offense
doctrine. Selection of any other path could only be interpreted as blind
adherence to an outmoded concept.
TnE

AmERCAN EXPERIENCE

Evolution of United States Divorce Law and Policy
After the stubborn demise of the ecclesiastical courts in England in 1857,
the nonwaivable fault grounds and defenses used in ecclesiastical court separations remained the common law of divorce in the United States. 1n 5 Early
American decisions held that matrimonial bonds were nothing more than a
civil contract formed by consent of the parties. Because general judicial
divorce jurisdiction was considerated violative of the tenth amendment prior
to 1850, divorces were only accomplished by means of special legislative
decrees by the states.1 6 But this cumbersome process was deemed unsatisfactory and special divorce legislation was finally eradicated in favor of general
7
divorce jurisdiction in the courts."1

The usual state statute provided for granting a divorce upon proof by
the innocent party of a statutorily enumerated offense or fault committed
by the defendant. The most frequently appearing matrimonial faults include
adultery, cruelty, desertion, and criminal convictions."18 The American concept of matrimonial defenses mirrored their English predecessors with primary
importance placed upon recrimination, collusion, connivance, and condonation.219
It is presently dear that the thrust of our fifty states' legislative attempts
to regulate fault-oriented divorce within their respective jurisdictions has
created a moral dilemma in the field of modern domestic relations. The
parties to a marriage must now concoct some legally designated "sin" or
fault, after their marriage has broken down for other reasons, to get the
115.
116.
See 2 C.

117.

118.
119.

McCurdy, Divorce -A Suggested Approach, 9 VAND. L. REv. 685, 686 (1956).
Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L, Rr;v, $R 36 (1966).
VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWs 14-18 (1932).
N. BLAKE, THE ROAD To RENO 48-64 (1962),
C. VERNIER, supra note 116, at 64-71.
WadHngton, supra note lo.t4t 8@1
!.9,
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unworkable relationship dissolved. This legal and moral dilemma may be
resolved only by the introduction of the more modern breakdown of marriage
concept into our now-antiquated methods of divorce.120
The design of the following survey of American divorce law is to show
that the trend in the United States is steadily toward adoption of the breakdown approach to marriage dissolution - an end result that may be obtained
without jeopardizing the time-honored institution of marriage.
The New York Divorce Syndrome and Its Attempted Cure
Long lauded as a pacesetter in the arena of legislative reform, New York
has nonetheless been granted the dubious distinction of having had one of
the most antiquated divorce laws in the United States. At first glance New
York's 1960 divorce rate of one out of every seventeen marriages seems
enviable when compared with the national figure of one divorce for every four
marriages.121 But this illusion is somewhat dispelled when one realizes that
the actual number of New York divorces is about one-third to one-half
122
greater than the number of recorded divorces in the state.
There were several contributing causes for the low divorce rate in New
1 23
York, foremost of which was New York's sole divorce ground of adultery.
As a result of this iron-clad restriction upon divorce attempts, intrastate
evasionary tactics reached a new pinnacle in New York before the legislative
reform in 1966. A marriage could be dissolved if one member had disappeared for at least five years,1 2-4 or had been decreed incurably insane for a
five-year period,1 25 or was designated impotant, 1 26 or had been sentenced to
life imprisonment.12 Judicial attempts to ameliorate the harshness of the

120. Wadlington, supra note 116, at 40.
121. In 1965 there were 479,000 divorces in the United States with a national rate of
2.5 divorces per 1,000 population compared with a ratio of 2.2 per 1,000 in 1962. U.S. BUREAU
OF THE UNITED STATES 62 (1968). New York recorded
the lowest divorce rate in 1960, granting 7,235 divorces while marrying 123,620 couples;
WORLD ALMANAC 336 (1965). In 1965, New York, with a 0.5 rate, nearly duplicated its 1960
divorce date (0.4 divorces per 1,000 population) thereby again ranking lowest in the
United States. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 62
(1968). In 1965, New York granted 4,149 divorces, 2,942 annulments, and 327 dissolutions
for absence. 1966 Judicial Conference Rep. 425. Sce also Comment, Divorce Reform - One
OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT

State's Solution, 1967 DUKE L.J. 956, 967.
122. See Caswell v. Caswell, Ill N.Y.S.2d 875 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 117 N.Y.S.2d 326 (App.
Div. 1952). This case is a prime example of the Mexican divorce escape route pursued by
New Yorkers unable to obtain divorces at home.
123. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254, §2, repealing N.Y. Sess. Laws 1789, ch. 69 & N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 313, §7.
124. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw §§220, 221 (McKinney Supp. 1968). This "Enoch Arden"
provision required a five-year disappearance of one spouse, a diligent search for evidence
of his whereabouts by the petitioning party, a belief that the spouse is dead, and public
notice of filing.
125. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW §140 (f) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
126. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW §140(d) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
127. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw §6 (2) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
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situation resulted in the use of annulments instead of divorces in most cases. 1 28
Another device seized upon was the uncontested divorce where the defendant's
failure to contest the adultery evidence hampers the court's use of the
adversary method in eliciting the truth of the allegations. 12 9 Further relief
was sought through the use of out-of-state divorces 30 and bilateral Mexican
divorces. 31
It was not until 1966 that the New York legislature officially recognized
that divorce is the result and not the cause of a broken home, and that divorce
does not occur until after the marriage has completely broken down.

32

It

responded by adding new grounds for divorce including cruel and inhuman
treatment, confinement in prison for three years, abandonment for two years,
and two years separation under a separation decree or a recorded separation
agreement, and approving an expanded definition of adultery. 3 The new
law strains to engender a more realistic basis for New York's divorce law by
introducing nonfault grounds based upon a separation period, by establishing
a conciliation procedure, and by restricting migratory evasions. The culpability factor, the backbone of fault-oriented divorce law, is minimized in the
new legislation as the waiting periods of both the imprisonment and abandonment grounds are designed to evidence marriage breakdown. Likewise,
separation for two years under an agreement is a true nonfault approach
as is the separation pursuant to a judicial decree, since it may be converted
into a divorce decree after the waiting period elapses. 1 34 The restriction upon
the remarriage of the faulting party is also eliminated 1 5 as are the faultoriented defenses to divorce in the separation reform provisions."36
The New York legislative attempt reflects a compromise between fault
and nonfault principles. Like many compromises, the most effective provisions of both sides are sacrificed for the less objectionable but less effective.
The reformation of New York divorce law is weakened by compromising
128. In 1962, New York envisaged 4,224 divorces and 2,331 annulments as compared
with 400,308 divorces and 12,692 annulments nationally in the Census Bureau reporting
area. See Comment, supra note 121, at 967. Grounds for annulment included either spouse
being under the age of legal consent (N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw §7 (1) (McKinney Supp. 1968)
provides that age is not an absolute ground but a factor to be weighed), incapable of
understanding due to physical disability, fraud, duress, or force.
129. During the decade preceding July 1, 1956, only 8,013 divorces out of a possible
124,567 were contested. Klein, Increased Grounds for Divorce in New York State: A Proposal, 30 ALBANY L. R-v. 69, 74 (1966).
130. See Grossman, How Can We Make Divorce Realistic?, 23 N.Y. ST. B. BULL. 350
(1951). See also Klein, supra note 129, at 72.
181. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 21 App. Div. 2d 635, 253 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1st Dep't), vacating
43 Misc. 2d 462, 251 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1964). Now, New Yorkers may obtain a
divorce on as many as eighteen Mexican grounds including the nebulous mutual consent,
incurable mental alienation, cruel treatment, and threats and grave insults.
132. Comment, supra note 121, at 960, citing Fenberg, Can Divorce Be Made Respectable?, 45 WOMEN LAw J. 13 (1959).
133. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw §170 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
134. Comment, supra note 121, at 970.
135. N.Y. Dom. R.. LAw §8 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
136. Comment, supra note 121, at 972. The fault-based defenses of recrimination, connivance, collusion, and condonation may be maintained against a charge of adultery.
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nonfault, nonadversary policies with traditional fault policies, the creation of
intrastate evasionary devices, the right of privacy objection to the conciliation
procedure, and, finally, jurisdictional limitations to restrict recognition of
137
foreign decrees.
Linking nonfault grounds with grounds based upon fault and culpability
brings New York to an abrupt halt short of the exclusive adoption of nonfault divorce theories. The one-hundred-and-twenty-day conciliation period
of the nonfault separation provisions may be an impetus for "warring"
parties to choose the quicker but less desirable, and often fraudulent, faultbased divorce grounds. The "innocent" party's right to property in the
"guilty" spouse's estate would terminate once the separation agreement is
converted into a divorce. When this fact is buttressed by the expense of conciliatory hearings and additional attorneys' fees during the separation period,
intrastate avoidance or extrastate migratory divorces are often economic
necessities in avoiding the nonfault divorce procedures. 38 The right to
privacy in family law matters, first articulated in the landmark birth control
decision of Griswold v. Connecticut,139 has been urged as applicable to New
York's new compulsory conciliation procedure. The argument contemplates
a possible violation of marital privacy by nonconsensual surveillance of intimate relations. However, this contention will probably be outweighed by
the state's interest in preservation of the marital home and family unit.
Finally, the New York legislature's attempt through section 250 of the New
York Domestic Relations Law to limit extraterritorial evasion of the new
divorce law falls under the full faith and credit clause as to sister-state
decrees 14° and comity, a policy-based doctrine strictly adhered to by New
41
York judicial precedent on foreign decrees.1
New York's recognition of its need for divorce reform was long overdue.
The reform runs the gamut from the inherent weaknesses of its strict, faultoriented divorce law of pre-1966 vintage and the belief that no legislature
can ease its divorce restrictions and still foster the sanctity of marriage to the
compromised middle-ground of a part fault, part nonfault divorce policy
that recognizes the need for relief when marital bliss becomes emotional chaos.
Florida Divorce Law - Liberality Within the Fault Approach
The public policy of Florida with respect to divorce is liberal. 142 This
is illustrated by the comparatively short period of six months within which
137. Comment, supra note 121, at 979.
138. Comment, supra note 121, at 983.
139. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a cogent discussion of this speculative argument see
Comment, supra note 121, at 984.
140. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, §1. Res judicata requires that any judicial decree be given the same effect in sister states as it would be
given in the state where rendered if done by a competent court with a basis for jurisdiction, due notice, and hearing. Full faith and credit will be extended if the foreign
judgment is final and on the merits.
141. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955).

142.

Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950).
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legal residence can be acquired for purposes of instituting a divorce actionjurisdiction then being conferred upon the Florida courts. 4 3 The ten existing
grounds for divorce, set out by statute, also reflect this liberality. No divorce
44
may be granted unless one of the following facts appears:
(1) that the parties are within the degrees of consanguinity prohibited by the law;
(2) that the defendant is naturally impotent;
(3) that the defendant has been guilty of adultery;
(4) extreme cruelty by defendant to complainant;
(5) habitual indulgence by defendant in violent and ungovernable
temper;
(6) habitual intemperance of defendant;
(7) wilful, obstinate, and continued desertion from complainant by
the defendant for one year;
(8) that the defendant has obtained a divorce from the complainant
in any other state or country;
(9) that either party had a husband or wife living at the time of the
marriage sought to be annulled;
145
(10) that the defendant is incurably insane.
It will be observed that these ten grounds require that fault, blame, or
guilt be attributed to one of the parties before a basis of divorce can be found
to exist.
The Florida Legislature has chosen not to proscribe any defenses of general
application in divorce cases. Nevertheless, the ordinary defenses originating
in the common law are available and appropriate in Florida divorce litigation.
These include collusion,146 connivance, 14 7 and condonation 14 8 as absolute
defenses, and recrimination as a qualified defense based upon sound judicial
discretion tempered by public policy, public welfare, and the exigencies of
the case at bar. 49
Notwithstanding the drastic twentieth century reformation in societal
attitudes leading religion, the legal system, and the public in general to
change their viewpoints toward divorce, since 1892, the Florida Legislature has
made only one significant change in the divorce law.50 The courts have on
occasion acted upon the felt needs of society such as the inclusion of mental

143. FLA. STAT. §61.021 (1967).
144. FLA. STAT. §61.041 (1967).
145. FLA. STAT. §61.041 (1967), as amended by Fla. Laws 1969, -ch. 69-142 (effective
Sept. 1, 1969). The bill, as enacted, purports to amend chapter 65 of the Florida Statutes.
This chapter was formerly the divorce chapter, but was renumbered as chapter 61 in 1967.
146. Hall v. Hall, 93 Fla. 709, 112 So. 622 (1927).
147. McMillan v. McMillan, 120 Fla. 209, 162 So. 524 (1935).
148. Crews v. Crews, 130 Fla. 499, 178 So. 139 (1938).
149. Stewart v. Stewart, 158 Fla. 326, 29 So. 2d 247 (1946).
150. See note 145 supra. The residence requirement was altered from ninety to 180
days in 1957. FLA. STAT. §61.021 (1967). Late in the 1969 session a divorce reform bill,
based on marital breakdown was introduced by Rep. Gerald Lewis, Miami. The bill failed
to pass, but has been prefiled for the 1970 session. Letter to U. Fla. L. Rev. from Rep.
Gerald Lewis, July 30, 1969.
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cruelty and physical cruelty within the extreme cruelty grounds, 151 but their
efforts have been handicapped by the structure of seventy-six year old laws.
The time is ripe for Florida to reexamine its divorce laws in light of the
growing popularity of the breakdown of marriage theory as evidenced by its
increasing acceptance in our sister states. Of special significance would be a
provision for legal separation in Florida, since there is no present legal basis
for any type of complete dissolution other than absolute divorce.152 Accordingly, a first step in the revision of Florida divorce law would be to implement
a provision for divorce "from bed and board." This would serve as a stepping
stone to enactment of a subsequent "living apart" statute, whereby an absolute
divorce could be granted on the evidence of a legal separation decree coupled
with a continued, actual separation of the parties from some stated period
of time. If Florida's policy toward divorce is truly as liberal as the courts
have labeled it, then such a transition would be swift and painless.
Incompatibility of Temperament - Coexistence of Fault and Breakdown
Within the Same System
In an effort to supplement existing grounds for divorce previously based
entirely on matrimonial offenses, New Mexico,153 Oklahoma,154 and Alaska 55
have made incompatibility of temperament an additional avenue to divorce.
Although at first blush, this new ground appears to be nonfault in nature,
an examination of the leading cases in these jurisdictions reveals that the
courts have not always treated it in such a manner.
Incompatibility or incompatibility of temperament as a ground for divorce
may be broadly defined as such a deep and irreconciliable conflict between
the personalities of the parties that it is impossible for them to continue a
normal relationship. 56 In language reminiscent of the breakdown theory,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated: "[I]t is the legal recognition of the proposition . . . that if the parties are so mismated that their

marriage has in fact ended due to hopeless disagreement and discord the
'
courts should be empowered to terminate it as a matter of law.' 15
51
In the landmark case of Chappell v. Chappell,which presented the first
opportunity in Oklahoma for interpretation of its new incompatibility statute,
the Oklahoma supreme court held that "incompatibility" should not be a
ground for divorce where only one of the parties to a marriage is incompatible. The court reasoned that "incompatibility is a two-way [sic] proposition and should not be applicable where the party seeking the divorce is the
only one who is incompatible."'159 This type of reasoning, aimed at ascertain151.
152.
153.

Burns v. Burns, 153 Fla. 73, 13 So. 2d 599 (1943).
FLA. STAT. §61.031 (1967).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-7-1 (8) (1967).

154.
155.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.

156.

58 A.L.R.2d 1218, 1219 (1968).

ALASKA STAT.

12, §1271 (7) (Supp. 1969).
§09.55.110(5) (c) (1968).

157. Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799, 807 (3d Cir. 1952).
158. 298 P.2d 768 (Okla. 1956).
159. Id. at 771.
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ing and assigning fault or blame, is illustrative of the contention that incompatibility has not always been viewed within the breakdown category. However, in 1959, the Oklahoma supreme court clarified its position by stating
its approval of the proposition that incompatibility cannot exist on the part
of one partner, thus disregarding all contrary implications in Chappell.16o
It is now possible to interpret the Oklahoma view as treating incompatibility
more as a nonfault than as a fault ground for divorce.
New Mexico provides a second illustration of the judicial problems
created by the insertion of a nonfault ground (incompatibility) into a predominantly fault oriented statute. When confronted in Paletich v. Paletich'61
with the question whether recrimination should be a defense in a divorce
action based on incompatibility, the New Mexico supreme court emphasized
that if the parties were, in fact, irreconciliable, the public policy of the state
would be against a denial of divorce and recrimination would not be available as a defense. But four years later the holding in Clark v. Clark 62 undermined any suggestion in Paletich of a nonfault construction of incompatibility.
As a result, recrimination was reinstated as a defense to divorce action based
upon incompatibility "if under the circumstances it would shock the con163
science of the court to award a divorce."'
The status of incompatibility of temperament as a ground for divorce in
Alaska is not clear because of an absence of appellate decisions on the matter
since Alaska achieved statehood. Nonetheless, a predisposition to the fault
64
approach was indicated by the territorial court in Paddock v. Paddock
where a divorce was granted to a wife based upon the incompatibility of the
parties because of the fault of the husband.
In a final analysis based upon the experience of three states where
incompatibility is a ground for divorce, it does not appear to be a proper
vehicle for implementing a nonfault approach. There are several reasons
for this conclusion. Not only is incompatibility susceptible to too broad a
range of definitions, it is also plagued by too much judicial discretion. Additionally, the ingrained concept of fault is difficult for the judiciary to overcome. Professor Wadlington notes that:165
[T]he main difficulty is the impossibility of introducing incompatibility
into the existing fault-oriented framework of divorce law, since to a
large extent they cannot stand together. If incompatibility were given
a truly non-fault interpretation, it probably would preempt most other
grounds for divorce. On the other hand, the preservation of such
fault-oriented defenses as recrimination frustrates the apparent legislative intent that the addition of incompatibility as a ground should
serve the purpose of dissolving hopeless marriages.
160. Rakestraw v. Rakestraw, 345 P.2d 888, 890 (Okla. 1959). Defense counsel attempted
to infer from the Chappell holding that there could be instances where only one spouse was
incompatible.
161. 50 N.M. 224, 174 P.2d 826 (1946).
162. 54 N.M. 364, 225 P.2d 147 (1950).
163. Id. at 368, 225 P.2d at 149.
164. 240 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1956).
165. Wadlington, supra note 116, at 52.
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Based on the foregoing analysis, the solution to divorce reform does not
lie in a universal acceptance of incompatibility of temperament as a new
ground for divorce.
The Living Apart Statutes - The Final Step to Breakdown
There are basically four types of statutes that fall within the living-apart
category, all based on the fact that the parties have ceased to live together
without interruption for some prescribed period of time prior to instituting
a divorce action. 166 Since each type provides a ground for dissolution of the
marriage relationship, each will be examined separately.
Absolute Divorce After PriorLimited Divorce or Legal Separation. In ten
states either spouse may bring an action for divorce after a statutorily authorized period of time has elapsed from the granting of a legal separation
decree.1 6 For example, in Utah and Colorado the parties must have ceased
to cohabit for at least three years pursuant to such a decree. 16 Other states,
such as Wisconsin, require a longer period of time up to five years. 6 9 The
latest jurisdiction to enact this type of statute was Tennessee, which in 1963
amended its divorce law to permit its courts to grant an absolute divorce to
either party after two years of living apart following a decree of separation
from bed and board or separate maintenance.Y °
While these statutes appear to be nonfault in nature, it must be noted
that the traditional matrimonial offenses are the only grounds for securing
the original legal separation decree. Thus, fault remains an integral element
in obtaining a divorce, if not in the actual divorce litigation then at the
earlier legal separation hearing.
Voluntary Separation. Four states and the District of Columbia allow
divorce on the ground of voluntary separation. 1 71 These jurisdictions require
such a separation to be mutually agreeable to the parties not only at the
outset, but also for the duration of the statutorily prescribed period. One
illustration of this kind of living apart statute is provided by Delaware where
"a divorce may be granted at the suit of either party when the husband and
wife have voluntarily lived separate and apart without any cohabitation for

Wadlington, supra note 116, at 52-64.
ALA. CODE tit. 34, §22 (1) (Supp. 1967); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §46-1-1 (1)j (1963);
CONN. GEN. STAT. RFv. §46-30 (1958); LA. REv. STAT. §9:301 (1965); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§518.06(8) (1969); N.D. GENT. CODE §14-06-05 (1960); TENN. CODE ANN. §36-801(4) (Supp.
1968); UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-1 (8) (1953); VA. CODE ANN. §20-91 (9) (Supp. 1968); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §247.07 (7) (1957).
168. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §46-1-1 (1)j (1963); UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-1 (8) (Supp. 1969).
169. Wis. STAT. ANN. §247.07 (6) (Supp. 1969).
170. TENN. CODE ANN. §36-802 (Supp. 1969).
171. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §1522(11) (Supp. 1966); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN.
§16-904 (12) (1966); LA. REV. STAT. §9:301 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §24 (1966); iVs.
STAT. ANN. §247.07 (7) (1957).
166.

167.
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three consecutive years .. without. any reasonable expectation of reconciliation."172 Other variants of this type of statute differ only in the prescribed
period of separation. In the District of Columbia the period is a one-year
voluntary separation from bed and board 173 as opposed to Wisconsin's
requirement of a five-year period. 17Voluntary separation statutes can be considered nonfault in two important
aspects. 7 5 First, the parties may collusively agree to divorce and provide
grounds by merely living apart for a specific period, and second, the cause of
the separation is irrelevant since it makes no difference whether either party
was at fault. In another respect, however, the voluntary separation statutes
fall short of the mark of a truly nonfault approach because unless both
parties mutually agree to separate, no divorce will result. Accordingly, if
one spouse deserts or abandons the other, he will have no recourse other than
to wait to be sued for divorce by the so-called "injured party."
Divorce for Separation, but Only to the Innocent Party. There are two
states that have enacted statutes where separation for a prescribed period of
time is a ground for divorce, but ostensibly, suit can be brought only by the
party free from fault. One of these states is Vermont, where "an absolute
divorce may be decreed when a married person has lived apart from his or
her spouse for three consecutive years without fault on the part of the libelant,
and the court finds the resumption of marital relations is not reasonably
probable."'1 6 The Vermont cases interpreting this statute indicate that the
petitioner must affirmatively allege and establish that he had no part in
causing the separation. 77 The necessity of proving one's innocence as an
essential element to securing a divorce is an onerous and burdensome task
for the petitioner.
The other jurisdiction having this type of statute is Wyoming, which
requires only a two-year separation, but with divorce not permitted if the
separation has been induced or justified by a cause chargeable in whole or
in part to the party seeking the divorce. 178
In analyzing this third type of living-apart statute, there seems to be one
advantage in that it permits an absolute divorce to be obtained with a minimum of public name calling by the spouse who brings the action. As such,
statutes providing for divorce after and based upon separation, but only to
the innocent party, are clearly a compromise between the breakdown and
fault approaches. However, it is clear that they do not represent a desirable
half-way house.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Dr CoD.ANN. fit. 13, §1522(11) (Supp. 1969).
D.C. CODE ANN. §16-904 (a) (1967).
Wis. STAT. ANN. §247.07 (6) (Supp. 1969).
Wadlington, supra note 116, at 59.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit.15, §551 (7) (Supp. 1969).
West v. West, 115 Vt. 458; 63 A.2d 864 (1949).
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §20-47 (Supp. 1969).
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Divorce Based on Separation Without Agreement and Without Regard
to Fault. Of the four types of living-apart statutes, this last category most
effectively minimizes the role of fault in determining whether a divorce
should be granted. There are ten American jurisdictions that with minor
variations illustrate the increasing acceptance of divorce based on the "pure
breakdown" theory. 179 Their statutes have been interpreted to mean: 185
(1) either spouse may bring the action for divorce on such a
ground;
(2) the separation period need not have been voluntary on the
part of both spouses;
(3) there must have been a continuous separation of a specific
duration;
(4) the traditional fault defenses are inapplicable.
A brief discussion of the recently enacted Virginia Separation Statute
and its history in the Virginia courts will indicate the viability of a modem
nonfault approach to divorce. As amended by the Virginia General Assembly
in 1964, the statute now provides that "a divorce .. .may be decreed .. .on
the application of either party if and when the husband and wife have lived
separate and apart without any cohabitation and without interruption for
two years."''
This statute has been upheld in two subsequent cases, the first
holding that the statute would apply retroactively 1 2 and the second holding
that an abandoning husband was not barred from securing a divorce even
though the separation was his fault, since the party seeking a divorce need
18 3
not be an innocent spouse.
Virginia's experience appears to have been profitable. Recognition that
social policy dictates that there should be a means for terminating marriages
that have ceased to exist in fact is best effectuated by the enactment of this
fourth type of living-apart statute. That which has ceased to exist and cannot
regenerate itself nor be reborn ought to be buried efficiently and peacefully.
It is this fourth type of statute, providing for divorce after separation without
regard to agreement or fault, that best accomplishes such an end.
The Journey's End - The Arrival of the Breakdown Principle as
Implemented by the Clinical Approach
Since the introduction of the concept of breakdown is primarily a contribution of the social sciences, it is fitting that a psychological and clinical
approach be used to analyze the marriage relationship."8
179. ALA. CODE tit. 34, §22 (1) (Supp. 1967); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §25-312 (7) (1956);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §34-1202 (Supp. 1967); IDAHO CODE ANN. §32-610 (1963); Ky. REv. STAT.
§403.020 (1) (b) (1963); LA. REv. STAT. §9:301 (1965); P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 31, §321 (9) (1967);
Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 4629(4) (Supp. 1968-1969); VA. CODE ANN. §20-91 (Supp. 1968);
WAsH. REV. CODE tit. 26, §08.020 (9) (1961).
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Wadlington, supra note 116, at 63-64.
VA. CODE ANN. §20-91 (9) (Supp. 1968).
Hagen v. Hagen, 205 Va. 791, 139 S.E.2d 821 (1965).
Canavos v. Canavos, 205 Va. 744, 139 S.E.2d 825 (1965).
Mace, Marriage Breakdown or Matrimonial Offense: A Clinical or Legal Approach
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This is possible in light of the rapid progress in the understanding of
the marriage relationship and the development of high-level marriage coun
seling services. Accordingly, the time has come to abandon the present divorce
procedures based upon the unrealistic concept of the matrimonial offense
proved in court and to replace it with an investigatory system that will
establish with reasonable certainty whether the marriage has deteriorated
to the point of being unworkable. An entirely new approach with new
machinery is needed, with inquiry placed in the hands of trained psychologists
and counselors who would thoroughly investigate what has gone wrong with
the marriage, why it went wrong, and would then conclude what the
possibilities of an eventual reconciliation might be. Such an examination
would be a clinical rather than a legal study.
Having completed the investigation, a report of the findings would be
submitted to the court. If the judge is satisfied that the clinical evidence
shows that the marriage has broken down, a divorce decree could then be
granted without guilt being impugned to either party. Because the process
would guarantee the fullest exploration of reconciliation possibilities, consultation with these trained counselors might save many marriages that had
gone temporarily astray. This indeed would be desirable, especially since it
is the adversary process itself that discourages such a prospect.
When it is recalled that many divorces in the United States are granted
upon grounds of cruelty, the roles of the clinical psychologist and the marriage
counselor assume an increasing importance because they can best ascertain
and hopefully remedy the conflicts and tensions that are endangering the continued existence of a couple's marriage relationship. The beauty of the
process is that it fosters an impartial atmosphere with a cooperative spirit
between the spouses.
The obvious question that arises is whether the clinical process is currently feasible. The foremost obstacle is practical - a lack of trained specialists and facilities. Yet, a number of courts are currently utilizing the talents
of marriage counselors in divorce cases. These courts emphasize that counselors
provide a far more reliable index to the present and future status of a marriage relationship than does proof of the commission of a matrimonial
offense. 8 5 Since it is a logical extension of and necessary corollary to acceptance of the breakdown theory, more use of the clinical approach can be
expected in the future.
The trend toward the acceptance of the breakdown approach is now dear.
The American jurisdictions have traveled an arduous path, starting with the
strict matrimonial offense doctrine as illustrated by pre-reform New York
divorce law, then proceeding to the present Florida position where many
grounds for divorce are liberally interpreted by the courts. Jurisdictions
within this camp, however, still utilize a totally fault-oriented approach to
divorce. The first legislative attempts to introduce the breakdown concept
into divorce law were efforts to integrate this new theory into what remained
to Divorce?, 14 Am. U.L. REv. 178, 181 (1965).

185. Id. at 184.
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a fault-oriented framework. The demise of incompatibility of temperament
as a ground for divorce in some states has shown that the two approaches
cannot coexist within the same system. This should not be taken as a sign
that the breakdown approach has been tried and rejected, or that the proper
step is to return to the traditional fault approach. To the contrary, with the
change in societal attitudes toward marriage and divorce in the past century,
American divorce law must continue to push forward on its journey down the
reform path evidenced by recent enactment of the living-apart statutes. It
must ultimately strive for total acceptance of the pure breakdown approach,
which has worked well in states such as Virginia. Until this situation is
uniformly attained, American divorce reform will not have reached the end
of its journey.
The foregoing has illustrated that England and the United States are
moving toward ultimate acceptance of the breakdown principle. The original
English position of adherence to the strict matrimonial offense theory has
been modified by recent judicial decisions utilizing the breakdown approach.
A study of the American situation reveals a myriad of different positions, but
in the past ten years several jurisdictions have enacted divorce measures based
on the pure breakdown theory. This trend can be expected to continue. It
is significant that both countries started on the divorce reform journey from
the same point and, while following divergent paths, in the last analysis both
appear to be moving toward the same destination.
Once it is conceded that the best approach to divorce is through acceptance of the breakdown principle, there remains but one more step to take.
This is to implement the clinical approach into the breakdown framework
to assure that the system functions efficiently and smoothly.
WM. R. BOOSE, 111*
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